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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OUT ON A LIMB WITHOUT DIRECTION: HOW THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FOX v. FCC FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS BROADCAST INDECENCY AND WHY THE SUPREME
COURT MUST CORRECT THE CONFUSION

INTRODUCTION
During a live broadcast of the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono, the lead
singer of the band U2, accepted his award by exclaiming, “[t]his is really,
really fucking brilliant. Really, really great.”1 These words sparked a
firestorm between the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
viewers who found Bono’s statement to be indecent and obscene.2 While it
may be potentially shocking, how many times have you watched a live
interview on television and the response contained curse words or an
inappropriate statement? Perhaps the respondent was elated about a sporting
event, angered by an accident or simply, just plain crude. Does the
Constitution protect these statements as free speech?3 The answer is maybe.
As broadcasters continued to push the envelope with more controversial
programming, the FCC began to significantly tighten regulations for what
constituted an acceptable broadcast.4
The primary purpose of the FCC is to regulate “communications by radio,
television, wire, satellite and cable.”5 Until 2003, the FCC generally practiced
a restrained enforcement policy toward indecent broadcasts.6 Between 2002
and 2003, the FCC filed zero notices of apparent liability (NAL) regarding

1. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859 (2003) [hereinafter Golden Globes].
2. See id.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter First Amendment] (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
4. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text.
5. About the FCC, Fed. Communications Comm’n, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
6. See Matthew C. Holohan, Politics, Technology, & Indecency: Rethinking Broadcast
Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341, 345 (“Indecency was essentially a
non-issue for the first three years of former FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s tenure, as the
Commission worked to relax ownership restrictions in the broadcast industry.”).
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television broadcasts.7 This lax policy changed after Bono’s statement during
the 2003 Golden Globe Awards8 and the infamous Super Bowl half-time show
in 2004 when Janet Jackson’s breast was exposed to millions of viewers of all
ages.9
In response to the statement made by Bono during the Golden Globe
Awards, the Parents Television Council filed a complaint stating that the
material violated the FCC’s regulations against obscenity and indecency.10
The Enforcement Bureau rejected this complaint on two grounds. First, they
found that the F-word, while potentially crude or offensive, was not used to
“describe or depict sexual and excretory activities and organs.”11 Second, the
Bureau cited past precedent that “fleeting and isolated remarks of this nature
do not warrant Commission action.”12
Nearly six months later, the full FCC Board overruled the Enforcement
Bureau’s decision which prompted a new policy on fleeting expletives.13 This
policy abolished the protection given to networks when isolated or fleeting
expletives were used.14 The Commission also declared that “given the core
meaning of the F-word, any use of that word or a variation, in any context,
inherently has a sexual connotation.”15 Despite overturning the Enforcement
Board’s decision and finding Bono’s statements indecent, the FCC did not fine
NBC because its ruling represented a change in FCC policy.16 This revised
policy strengthened the FCC’s power to hold networks liable for the use of
fleeting expletives.17 With broadcasters now on notice for the new policy, Fox,
CBS and ABC, among others, brought suit against the FCC.18 On June 4,
2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the FCC’s revised
policy calling it “arbitrary and capricious.”19 While the court came to a logical
conclusion, the reasoning behind the decision merely presented a short-term
solution to a long-term issue. By failing to decide whether the FCC could

7. Indecency Complaints and NALS, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/ichart.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
8. See Golden Globes, supra note 1.
9. See Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on
Indecency, 22 SPG COMM. LAW 1, 9 (2004). During the 2004 Super Bowl half time performance,
Justin Timberlake removed a piece of Janet Jackson’s bustier exposing her right breast. Id.
10. See Golden Globes, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 19861.
12. Id.
13. See In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes II].
14. See id. at 4980.
15. Id. at 4978.
16. Id. at 4981–82.
17. See id. at 4982.
18. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
19. Id. at 455.
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regulate fleeting expletives, the court left broadcasters to twist in the wind.
Television and radio stations were forced to choose between the increasingly
restrictive FCC policies or the more ‘broadcast friendly’ ruling in the Second
Circuit’s decision in Fox v. FCC. On March 17, 2008, the Supreme Court
acknowledged this dilemma and granted the Solicitor General’s petition for
certiorari.
In this article, I argue that in order to remove the cloud of confusion over
broadcast indecency, the Supreme Court must address and clarify the
substantive rights afforded to broadcasters by the Constitution. Part I explores
the basic regulatory functions of the FCC. Part II traces the extensive history
of the FCC and how its power to regulate broadcasts evolved up until the 2003
Golden Globe Awards. Part III discusses the Golden Globe Awards decision
along with the major shifts in FCC policy leading up to Fox v. FCC. Part IV
summarizes the majority and dissenting opinion in Fox v. FCC. Part V
analyzes the reasoning of the case’s majority and dissenting opinion. Part VI
discusses how the court should have decided the case on constitutional grounds
and why the court’s failure to do so negatively impacted broadcasters and
forced future litigation. Part VII outlines the arguments each party made to the
Supreme Court for and against granting the writ of certiorari. Finally, this
article analyzes these arguments and discusses the possible routes the Supreme
Court may go when the case is heard this fall. If the Supreme Court intends to
address the confusion resulting from the decision in Fox, it must address the
substantive challenges presented by the networks.
I. THE BASIC REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE FCC
The FCC’s power to enforce regulations against indecent speech emanates
from 18 U.S.C. § 1464 which states “whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”20 While television
broadcasts do not use radio transmissions, the FCC still regulates these
broadcasts.21 Satellite transmissions, on the other hand, are not regulated by
the FCC because they are subscription services.22 The FCC is only able to
regulate indecent broadcasts between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.23

20. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004) [hereinafter § 1464] “Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.” Id.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2004).
22. Matthew S. Schwartz, A Decent Proposal: The Constitutionality of Indecency Regulation
on Cable and Direct Broadcast Satellite Services, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 17 (2007).
23. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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Any broadcasts outside of these times is protected and constitutes a “safe
harbor period.”24
The FCC’s regulatory power is limited by both the First Amendment to the
Constitution25 and § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934.26 The First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech;27 however, not all speech is
prohibited from regulation.28 Section 326 explicitly denies the FCC the right
to censor speech, stating:
nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
29
means of radio communication.

As the FCC has become more active in regulating broadcasts in the past
decade, tensions have increased over what the FCC can and cannot regulate.
This creates an interplay between Congress and the courts to determine the
authority that the FCC derives from 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UNTIL 2003 GOLDEN GLOBES DECISION
To fully grasp the significance of the FCC’s changed policies and the
resulting broadcaster confusion, it is imperative to have a strong understanding

24. Id. at 669–70.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2004) [hereinafter Communications
Act].
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and
no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. No person
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication.
Id.
27. Id.
28. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744–45 (1978) (quoting Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919):
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was
said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words
*745 that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.)
29. Communications Act of 1934, supra note 26.
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of the history of the FCC’s regulatory power. This historical background
begins with the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Pacifica in 1978.
Continuing from this monumental decision, this section will trace significant
Bureau, FCC and Court decisions leading up to the 2003 Golden Globes
decision.
A.

FCC v. Pacifica—Supreme Court Sets Early Standards for Regulation

In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s authority
to sanction broadcasters for airing indecent material, opening the door for an
increase in FCC and judicial involvement in the regulation of indecent
communications.30 In 1973, George Carlin, a satirist, went before a live
California audience and recorded a monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”31 This
12-minute piece was premised, as Carlin put it, as “the words you couldn’t say
on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say, ever.”32
On October 30, radio station WBAI-FM in New York, broadcast Carlin’s
monologue at 2:00 p.m. as part of a discussion about language.33 Before the
broadcast, the station issued a disclaimer stating that the monologue featured
“sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.”34 On
November 28, 1973, John Douglas sent a complaint to the FCC regarding the
monologue.35 Douglas’s concern arose when he heard the monologue while
driving in his car with his young son.36 While acknowledging some social
value, Douglas complained that the broadcast was not appropriate for that time
of the day given the ability of children to listen to the program.37
In response to the complaint, Pacifica highlighted the purpose of the
program38 and the explicit warning of sensitive language.39 Pacifica even went
on to describe Carlin as “a significant social satirist” who “like Twain and Sahl
before him, examines the language of ordinary people . . .Carlin is not
30. See RICHARD PARKER, FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 222 (2003). (citing Ginsberg v. State of New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1968); Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
31. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 726.
32. Id. at 751. (“The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands
and maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor . . . and a bourbon.”).
33. Id. at 729–30.
34. Id. at 730.
35. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The broadcast was played “during a program about contemporary society's attitude
toward language.” Id.
39. Id. Before the program was broadcast, listeners had been warned that it included
“sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.” Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

388

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII:383

mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and
essentially silly our attitudes towards those words.”40 In a declaratory order,
the FCC responded that Pacifica “could have been the subject of administrative
sanctions.”41 No sanctions were ever imposed. The FCC found that the
monologue was not obscene; however, the language used was determined to be
“patently offensive.”42 The FCC articulated that the concept of decency “is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”43
Using this standard, the FCC found that the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue
was “indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464.”44 In a separate comment
issued shortly thereafter, the FCC stated that “[i]n some cases, public events
likely to produce offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity
for journalistic editing. Under these circumstances we believe that it would be
inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language.”45 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the FCC Order on a 2-1 vote.46 The United States Supreme Court
subsequently granted the FCC’s petition for certiorari.47
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found the FCC Order to be
constitutional. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, analyzed whether the
FCC’s Order was a form of censorship forbidden by § 326 of the
Communications Act,48 whether the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue was
indecent,49 and if so, whether the FCC’s Order violated the First Amendment
to the Constitution.50

40. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 730.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 731.
43. Id. at 731–32.
44. Id. at 732.
45. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 733.
46. Id. Each judge wrote separately. Judge Tamm felt that the order was essentially
censorship violating § 326 of the Communications Act. Chief Judge Bazelon’s, while concurring
with the result, reasoned that § 326 was inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by § 1464. Judge
Leventhal, as the lone dissent, reasoned that the FCC could regulate the language “as broadcast.”
Id.
47. Id. at 734.
48. See Communications Act, supra note 26.
49. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 740. Indecent defined as “a: altogether unbecoming:
contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or
appropriate: hardly suitable: unseemly: not conforming to generally accepted standards of
morality. . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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First, Justice Stevens found that the FCC Order was not forbidden by §
326.51
It was clear that the FCC could not edit broadcasts before they were
shown.52 However, the Court found that it was not censorship for the FCC to
look to past program content when making the decision whether to renew a
licensee agreement.53 Section 326 also carved out an exception to the
censorship rule giving the FCC the power to sanction those broadcasts which
contained “obscene, indecent or profane language.”54 Thus, the FCC Order
was not forbidden by § 326.55
Justice Stevens then analyzed whether Carlin’s monologue was considered
indecent under § 1464.56 Section 1464 forbade the broadcasting of any
“obscene, indecent, or profane language.”57 Since the FCC acknowledged that
the monologue was not obscene, Pacifica argued that indecent and obscene
mean virtually the same thing.58 Justice Stevens rejected this theory by
pointing to the disjunctive nature of § 1464.59The Court found that a normal
definition of indecent “refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality.”60 The Court left the task of determining the standards of morality to
the FCC. Using the FCC’s indecency standard, the broadcast of Carlin’s
monologue was found to be indecent.61
Justice Stevens quickly dismissed Pacifica’s claim that the First
Amendment prohibited any regulation on public broadcasts.62 The issue facing

51. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738; see also Communications Act, supra note 26.
52. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738.
53. Id. at 746 (citing KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 60 App. D.C. 79,
47 F.2d 670 (1931); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 61 App. D.C.
311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932)).
54. Id. at 737. See also Communications Act, supra note 26.
55. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738.
56. Id. at 738–39.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004).
58. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739. Pacifica, knowing that their broadcast was not
considered indecent, tried to get the Court to conflate the terms indecency and obscenity so that
they would not be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Id.
59. Id. at 739–40. Justice Stevens stated that “the words ‘obscene, indecent, or profane’ are
written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning.” Id.
60. Id. at 740.
61. Id. In finding the monologue indecent, “the Commission identified several words that
referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs, stated that the repetitive, deliberate use of
those words in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive.”
Id.
62. Id. at 745. The Court pointed to numerous examples where First Amendment regulation
was valid:
The government may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight. See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031. It may pay heed to the
“‘commonsense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties.” Bates v.
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the Court was whether “a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with
sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content.”63 The Court
looked to two different themes to analyze this First Amendment issue. First,
broadcast media in the United States had become uniquely pervasive.64 Media
broadcasting, unlike someone speaking out in public, cannot be easily
avoided.65 Due to this pervasiveness, Stevens suggested that “[p]atently
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen,
not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder.”66 Secondly, “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read.”67 Carlin’s monologue aired at 2:00 p.m.68 There was
no indication that the FCC tried to prohibit this monologue.69 The Court
concluded that the FCC’s decision was based on a nuisance rationale.70 This
approach emphasized the context of the broadcast.71 Justice Sutherland wrote
that a “nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place—like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard.”72 The Court held that this nuisance was
within the realm of the FCC’s authority to sanction a broadcaster.73
In Justice Powell’s concurrence, he emphasized the narrowness of the
holding. Pertinent to this essay, Powell wrote that “the Commission’s holding,
and certainly the Court’s holding today, does not speak to cases involving the
isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast,
as distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent
here.”74
State Bar of Arizona, supra, 433 U.S., at 381, 97 S.Ct., at 2707. It may treat libels against
private citizens more severely than libels against public officials. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789. Obscenity may be wholly
prohibited. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. And only
two Terms ago we refused to hold that a “statutory classification is unconstitutional
because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.”
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, 427 U.S., at 52, 96 S.Ct., at 2443.

Id.
63. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745.
64. Id. at 748.
65. See id. at 749.
66. Id. at 748.
67. Id. at 749.
68. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 729–30.
69. See id. at 749. The Court compares this regulation with children being prohibited from
certain bookstores or movie theatres. Id.
70. Id. at 750.
71. See id.
72. Id. (quoting Justice George Sutherland in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926)).
73. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750.
74. Id. at 760–61.
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Interpretations post-Pacifica- Bureau Institutes Passive Approach

For the next several years, a finding of indecency required a situation very
similar to Carlin’s monologue. This high burden made it virtually impossible
for a station or network to be penalized. The first test came less than a year
after the Pacifica decision. Morality in Media of Massachusetts, Inc. filed a
petition to deny a license renewal application for the WGBH Educational
Foundation75 alleging that WGBH-TV “failed in its responsibility to the
community by consistently broadcasting offensive, vulgar, and otherwise
material harmful to children without adequate supervision or parental
warnings.”76 The Enforcement Bureau of the FCC denied Morality’s petition
finding that material believed to be offensive by some is not enough to warrant
the abandonment of a license.77
In 1981, the American Legal Foundation (ALF) filed a petition to deny a
license renewal application for Pacifica Foundation, licensee of Station WPFW
(FM).78 ALF alleged several violations including a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1464. In one example, ALF stated that on January 18, 1979 at 8:20 a.m., “a
male announcer repeatedly used such words as ‘motherfucker,’ ‘fuck’ and
similar indecent language.”79 Despite the frequent use of the language, the
Enforcement Bureau found that “ALF has not shown that such use was more
than isolated use in the course of a three year license term.”80 Therefore,
ALF’s petition for this complaint was denied.81
C. The Reconsideration Order—The FCC Gets Aggressive With Broadcast
Regulation
From 1975 to 1987, the FCC did not take any action against a single
licensee for indecent broadcasts.82 This changed with a string of decisions
75. See In Re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation For Renewal of License for
Noncommercial Educational Station WGBH-TV, Boston, Massachusetts, 69 F.C.C. 1250 (1978)
[hereinafter WGBH].
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1251.
78. See In Re Application of Pacifica Foundation For Renewal of License for
Noncommercial Station WPFW (FM), Washington, D.C., 95 F.C.C. 2d 750 (1983) [hereinafter
WPFW].
79. Id. at 757. ALF also alleged that:
WPFW’s complaint file at the Commission contains two letters which indicate that on
October 10, 1979, at 11:50 a.m. such language as ‘mother fucker’ and ‘shit’ was
broadcast; and on May 21, 1978, from 9:30 am to 11:30 a.m., an album which contains
the words ‘fuck’, ‘shit’ and ‘assholes’ was broadcast.
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 758.
82. See In the Matter of Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, et al., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987)
[hereinafter Reconsideration Order].
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made in April, 1987.83 The result was a significant change in policy that made
it easier for the FCC to regulate broadcasts.84 To give broadcasters guidance
for its new enforcement standard, the FCC issued the Reconsideration Order,
using the April cases as examples.85 The FCC began its discussion of
indecency by emphasizing the importance of “specific factual settings because
of the crucial role of context to the issue.”86 The FCC stated that the indecency
standard was the same one laid out in Pacifica in 1978.87 To determine
whether language was “patently offensive,” the FCC would consider variables
such as:
an examination of the actual words or depictions in context to see if they are,
for example, ‘vulgar’ or ‘shocking,’ a review of the manner in which the
language or depictions are portrayed, an analysis of whether allegedly
offensive material is isolated or fleeting, a consideration of the ability of the
medium of expression to separate adults from children, and a determination of
88
the presence of children in the audience.

While § 1464 gave the FCC the authority to prohibit obscene and indecent
material, the Supreme Court had emphasized that this power may only be used
during a reasonable time.89 Before the Reconsideration Order, 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. was generally considered to be a safe harbor period for indecent
broadcasting because children were not presumed to be in the audience.90 In
the Reconsideration Order, however, the FCC explicitly rejected this bright
line rule, stating that penalties depended on the “available data for that market”
and whether there is a “reasonable risk that children may have been in the
radio audience at the time of the broadcast.”91 Rather than maintain a passive
approach to broadcast regulation, the FCC broadened its regulatory power by
making it clear that a violation did not require a scenario similar to Carlin’s

83. Id. See Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Rcd 2698 (1987) (KPFK-FM); The Regents of
the University of California, 2 FCC Rcd 2703 (1987) (KCSB-FM); Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of
Pa., 2 FCC Rcd 2705 (1987) (WYSP(FM)).
84. See Reconsideration Order supra note 82, at 934.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Pacifica decision found that a broadcast would be considered indecent if the
language describes “in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.” Id.
88. Id. at 932.
89. Reconsideration Order supra note 82, at 931. MIM was trying to persuade the court to
apply § 1464 in a way that would prohibit certain sexually explicit broadcasts at all times during
the day. The court rejected this approach. Id.
90. See id. at 930.
91. Id. at 932.
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monologue.92 The three cases in the Reconsideration Order highlighted this
major shift in policy.93
For the next decade, the FCC continued to struggle to create definite
standards. In response to a ruling by the D.C. Court of Appeals that vacated
the decisions punishing broadcasts occurring after 10 p.m., Congress directed
the FCC to “enforce the provisions of . . . § 1464 on a 24 hour per day basis.”94
The FCC followed this directive and banned all broadcasts that contained
indecent material.95 In 1991, this total ban was struck down.96 In 1995, the
court ruled that a “safe harbor” time period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
was both narrowly tailored and satisfied a compelling public interest.97 During
these times, indecent material is allowed to be broadcast without regulation.98
D. New FCC Order Further Muddies the Water on What Is Considered
Indecent
In 2001, the FCC issued a “Policy Statement to provide guidance to the
broadcast industry regarding our case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and

92. Id. at 930.
93. See id. at 930–33.
The first case, against KPFK-FM and Pacifica, dealt with a broadcast which occurred after 10:00
p.m and contained portions of a long-running play from Los Angeles. The FCC found that these
excerpts were full of “vulgar and shocking language” that “were more than fleeting or isolated”
and determined the language patently offensive, along with the reasonable risk that children
might hear the broadcast, the FCC which amounted to“actionable indecency within the meaning
of Section 1464.” Id.
The second case, against WYSP-FM and Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Pennsylvania,
dealt with the Howard Stern Show, which was broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
While this show contained indecent material and was aired at a time when there was a reasonable
risk that children could be listening, the FCC emphasized the nature of the material. Although the
language “involved innuendo and double entrendre” and that this sort of dialogue was susceptible
to multiple interpretations by listeners, the FCC stated that the “sexual import of certain
references in the material was inescapable and understandable given the surrounding context of
the discussion.” Therefore, the FCC found the material to be actionable indecency. Id.
The final case, against KCSB-FM and the Regents of the University of California, dealt with a
musical recording broadcast. This broadcast recording contained material deemed patently
offensive and was broadcast at a time when children may have been listening. Despite the fact
that the broadcast was a musical recording, the FCC emphasized that it was still subject to
regulation. Id.
94. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
95. See id.
96. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.Cir.1991). The court
reasoned that “our previous holding in Act I that the Commission must identify some reasonable
period of time during which indecent material may be broadcast necessarily means that the
Commission may not ban such broadcasts entirely.” Id.
97. Action for Children’s Television, 58 F.3d at 669.
98. Id.
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our enforcement policies with respect to broadcast indecency.”99 The FCC
offered an analytical approach coupled with numerous examples.100
To determine broadcast indecency, the FCC created a two-prong test where
(1) “material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or
activities”101 and (2) “the broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.”102 To
determine whether material was patently offensive, the full context of the
broadcast must be considered.103 The FCC listed three principal factors that
are important in its decision-making process. These factors included:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual
or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats
at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether
the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material
104
appears to have been presented for its shock value.

The FCC repeatedly emphasized that context was critical and that no single
factor automatically made a broadcast indecent.105
For the first factor, the FCC noted that descriptions which are more graphic
or explicit are more likely to be found patently offensive.106 The FCC then
gave twelve examples of broadcasts that were either issued a warning or a fine
for being patently offensive.107 For the second factor, the FCC emphasized
that fleeting sexual or excretory references are generally not found to be
indecent.108 For example, during a South Carolina broadcast, one individual
said “[t]he hell I did, I drove mother-fucker.”109 The FCC found that the
“broadcast contained only a fleeting and isolated utterance which, within the
context of live and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Commission
sanction.”110 However, some fleeting references found to be patently offensive

99. See In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, Policy Statement, 16
F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
100. Id. at 8004.
101. Id. at 8002. (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 1838, 1840–
41 (2000)).
102. Id. (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 1841(2000)).
103. Id. The court articulates that the “standard is that of an average broadcast viewer or
listener and not the sensibilities of any individual complainant” when determining whether
patently offensive. Id.
104. Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8003.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 8004–07.
108. Id. at 8008.
109. Policy Statement, supra note, at 8009.
110. Id.
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could be considered indecent.111 For the third factor, the FCC stressed that the
presentation of the material is an important consideration.112 While this Order
attempted to clarify FCC standards, the open-ended nature caused some
difficulty for broadcasters to precisely know whether a broadcast would be
considered appropriate.
III. 2003 GOLDEN GLOBE AWARDS AND SUBSEQUENT SHIFTS IN FCC POLICY
A

The Initial Golden Globe Decision—Keeping with the Past

By 2006, after several policy changes, the FCC had reached the height of
its indecency crackdown.113 Broadcasters were challenged to keep current
with the ever-changing FCC indecency standards. These new policies had
allowed the FCC to regulate and penalize more broadcasts than ever before.
So what happened between 2001 and 2006 to cause such a dramatic shift in
approach to regulating broadcasts? While one specific broadcast did not lead
to all of the changes witnessed before Fox v. FCC, it is clear that several
decisions altered the FCC’s policies toward indecency regulation.
In 2003, after Bono stated “this is really, really fucking brilliant” during a
live broadcast, the Parents Television Council filed a complaint alleging a
violation of the FCC’s obscenity and/or indecency policy.114 The Enforcement
Bureau rejected the complaint115 and immediately found that the material was
not obscene.116 To determine if the broadcast was indecent, the Bureau looked
to the definition of indecent found in the FCC’s Policy Statement released in
2001.117 The Bureau found that the F-word used here did not “describe or

111. Id. at 8009–10. Fleeting references to sexual activities with children can be found
indecent. For example a NAL was issued for this joke: “What is the best part of screwing an
eight-year-old? Hearing the pelvis crack. Id. at 8009. Also, extreme explicit references can be
found indecent such as “suck my dick you fucking cunt.” These cases show that a single fleeting
expletive can be enough to justify receiving a NAL. Id. at 8010.
112. Id. A presentation on sex education may not be indecent whereas a skit for shock value
could be. See id.
113. See Indecency Complaints and NALS, at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ComplStatChart.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
114. See Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19859.
115. Id. at 19862.
116. Id. at 19861. To determine obscenity the Bureau looked to three factors found in Miller
v. California:
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, must find that the
material, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the material must depict or
describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable
law; and (3) the material, taken as a whole, must lack serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. Id.
117. Id. at 19860–61. The two factors necessary for indecency: “First, the material alleged to
be indecent must fall within the subject matter scope of our indecency definition-that is, the
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depict sexual and excretory activities and organs.”118 Rather, the word was
used as an “adjective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation.”119 The
Bureau also emphasized that “fleeting remarks of this nature do not warrant
Commission action.”120 This situation was nearly identical to an example in
the 2001 Policy Statement where an individual said the F-word over a live
broadcast.121 Because the use of the F-word was determined to not be obscene
or indecent, the airing of the program did not violate FCC regulations.122 This
decision reflected the view that a fleeting expletive, especially without
referencing sexual activities or excretory functions, does not generally warrant
an FCC sanction.123 This position was the culmination of precedent
established after the original Pacifica decision.
B.

2004 Super Bowl half-time Fiasco—The Winds of Change Begin to Blow

On February 1, 2004, during the Super Bowl half-time performance, Justin
Timberlake removed a piece of Janet Jackson’s bustier briefly exposing her
right breast.124 This widely viewed incident garnered both the attention of the
FCC and Congress.125 Powell, the Chairman of the FCC, immediately
commented that the incident was a “classless, crass, and deplorable stunt.”126
On February 11, 2004, hearings on broadcast indecency took place in the
Senate.127 Both the House and the Senate worked extensively to give the FCC
the power to fine violators more significantly than in the past.128 The FCC was
becoming more vigilant toward broadcast regulation and was using its teeth to
inflict damaging fines.129
Shortly thereafter, the FCC revisited the
Enforcement Bureau’s Golden Globe decision.130

material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities. . . . Second, the
broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium.” Id.
118. Id. at 19861.
119. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19861.
120. Id.
121. See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009.
122. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19862.
123. See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009.
124. Fallow, supra note 9, at 1.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Holohan, supra note 6 at 347.
127. Id.
128. See id. The House passed a bill “enabling the Commission to fine offenders up to
$500,000 per offensive (up from the previous maximum of $27,500).” Id.; Fallow, supra note 9,
at 3. (“The Senate version would increase the statutory maximum to $275,000 for the first
indecency violation with increasing fines up to $500,000 for the third.”).
129. See id.
130. See Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4975.
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C. Revisiting the Golden Globes—The FCC Changes Course
In light of the public outcry and Congressional efforts after the Super Bowl
fiasco, the FCC decided to review the Enforcement Bureau’s decision for the
2003 Golden Globe Awards.131 In reviewing the Bureau’s decision, the FCC
used the same indecency standard that required indecent material to “describe
or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities” and be “patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium.”132 The FCC, contrary to the Bureau’s decision, found that the Fword “in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls
within the first prong of our indecency definition.”133 This was a major change
in policy because past decisions had made it clear that a fleeting use of the Fword without sexual connotation generally did not fulfill this first prong.134
The FCC also stated that the F-word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and
explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language. Its use
invariably invokes a coarse sexual image.”135 Therefore, the F-word
automatically fulfills the second prong of the indecency standard. With both of
these prongs met, the FCC found Bono’s remark actionably indecent.136
The major change in this decision was the abrupt halt to the past FCC
policy on fleeting expletives when the F-word was used. The FCC found that
any interpretation indicating that fleeting expletives are non-actionable is “no
longer good law.”137 The FCC also emphasized that specific words do not
need to be repeated to be considered patently offensive.138 Noting the policy to
protect children, the FCC found that even the isolated use of this language
could enlarge “a child’s vocabulary in a second.”139 Further, the FCC found
that without action against isolated expletives, the use of this language would
become more widespread.140 Finally, the FCC pointed out that there have been
numerous technological advances which make it possible to delay broadcasting
by several seconds, enabling these expletives to be bleeped out.141
While the FCC argued that this decision was “not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica,” the change of course by the FCC was

131. See id.
132. Id. at 4977.
133. Id. at 4978. The Enforcement Bureau, on the other hand, found the word ‘fuck’ to be an
adjective or an intensifier. Id.
134. See id.
135. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4979.
136. Id. at 4982.
137. Id. at 4980.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 4982.
140. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4979.
141. Id. at 4980.
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clear.142 This decision put broadcasters on “clear notice that, in the future, they
will be subject to potential enforcement action for any broadcast of the F-word
or variation thereof in situations such as the one described here.”143 NBC,
Viacom and Fox, among others, filed suit against the FCC’s new policy raising
both statutory and constitutional issues.144 While this litigation was pending,
the FCC applied its Golden Globes ruling to several subsequent cases.
D. Omnibus Order- The FCC Tries to Clarify New Standards
In 2006, the FCC acknowledged that many broadcasters felt its standards
lacked certainty.145 On March 15, 2006, the FCC released a memorandum
(Omnibus Order) filled with examples to provide “substantial guidance to
broadcasters and the public about the types of programming that are
impermissible under our indecency standard.”146 The Omnibus Order was
divided into three categories.147 The first category had six examples where the
FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability.148 The second category had four
examples where the broadcasts were determined to be indecent, but
nevertheless, no forfeiture was imposed.149 Finally, the third category
contained twenty-eight examples of broadcasts that were not in violation of
FCC indecency regulations.150
In line with the recent Golden Globes decision, the FCC made it clear that
any use of the F-word was presumptively indecent.151 In addition, the FCC

142. Id. at 4982. The FCC’s change in policy is a clear departure from the Policy Statement
issued in 2001.
143. Id.
144. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
145. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order].
146. Id. at 2665.
147. See id. at 2670–2721.
148. See id. at 2670–90. Examples include: “The Surreal Life 2,” “Con El Corazon En La
Mano,” Fernando Hidalgo Show,” Video Musicales,” “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons,” and
“The Pursuit of D.B. Cooper.”
149. See id. at 2690–2700. Examples include: “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards,” “The
2003 Billboard Music Awards,” “NYPD Blue” and “The Early Show.”
150. See Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2700–21. Examples include: “Alias,” “Will and
Grace,” “Two and a Half Men,” “Committed,” “Golden Phoenix Hotel & Casino Commercial,”
“The Oprah Winfrey Show,” “Political Advertisement,” “The Amazing Race 6,” “Various
Programs Containing Expletives (various dates between August 31, 2004 and February 28,
2005),” “Family Guy,” “The Academy Awards,” “8 Simple Rules,” “The Today Show,” “The
Simpsons,” “America’s Funniest Home Videos,” “Green Bay Packers v. Minnesota Vikings” and
“Medium.”
151. Id. at 2685. In each of these examples, the FCC pointed out that the word “fuck” was
used and therefore, the broadcast was indecent. “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons.” Id. at 2684–
2685. “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards.” Id. at 2691. “The 2003 Billboard Music Awards.”
Id. at 2693.
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found that the word “shit” is a “vulgar excretory term so grossly offensive”
that it, too, was to be considered presumptively indecent.152 For these words to
be broadcast without penalty, the broadcaster must show that their use was
“essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work or essential to
informing viewers on a matter of public importance.”153 This heightened
scrutiny was not equally applied to other controversial curse words.154 With
many broadcasters unsure about the parameters of FCC indecency regulations,
the FCC had hoped that this Order would provide clarity to this murky
subject.155
E.

Remand Order—The FCC Takes Another Look at the Omnibus Order

On September 7, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court granted a request by the
FCC for a voluntary remand to review and address petitioner’s arguments.156
Nearly two months later, on November 6, 2006, the FCC issued a new order
(Remand Order) which revisited the second category within the Omnibus
Order.157 This category addressed the four broadcasts that the FCC found to be
indecent even though no fine was issued.158 This Remand Order is especially
important because of its future role in Fox v. FCC.
The first broadcast was the 2002 Billboard Music Awards.159 In this
particular program, Cher proclaimed in her acceptance speech that “[p]eople
have been telling me I’m on the way out every year, right? So fuck ‘em.”160
Fox argued that Cher’s use of the F-word was meant as a vulgar insult, not one

152. Id. at 2686. In each of these examples, the FCC pointed out where the word “shit” was
used and therefore, the broadcast was indecent. “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons.” Id. at 26842685. “The Pursuit of D.B. Cooper.” Id. at 2688. “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards.” Id. at
2691. “The 2003 Billboard Music Awards.” Id. at 2693. “NYPD Blue.” Id. at 2693. “The Early
Show.” Id. at 2699.
153. Id. at 2700.
154. Id. at 2710. The FCC looked at twenty complaints containing the words or phrases:
“hell,” “damn,” “bitch,” “pissed off,” “up yours,” “ass,” “for Christ’s sake,” “kiss my ass,” “fire
his ass,” “ass is huge” and “wiping his ass.” They concluded that, while these words may upset
some viewers, in the given circumstances their use did not rise to an actionable level of
indecency. Id.
155. Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2724. Then Commissioner of the FCC, Michael J.
Copps, wrote, “Although it may never be possible to provide 100 percent certain guidance
because we must always take into account specific and often-differing contexts, the approach in
today’s orders can help to develop such guidance and to establish precedents.” Id.
156. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2007).
157. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order].
158. Id.
159. Id. at 13322.
160. Id.
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discussing sexual activities.161 The FCC rejected this claim and proceeded to
explain their policy regarding the F-word and how it is presumptively
indecent.162 This was the same method of application as applied in the new
Golden Globe decision. The FCC also rejected Fox’s claim that because the
word was fleeting, it should not be actionably indecent.163
The second broadcast was the “2003 Billboard Music Awards” where
Nicole Richie asked the audience, “[h]ave you ever tried to get cow shit out of
a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.”164 Similar arguments were made
here by Fox regarding the use of the F-word and S-word.165 The FCC again
rejected these arguments.166
The third broadcast was “The Early Show.”167 During an interview, guest
Twila Tanner responded to a question saying, “I knew he was a bullshitter
from Day One.”168 The FCC acknowledged a more restrained position when
dealing with news programming.169 The FCC explained that the strong ties
between the First Amendment and news programming require a more
deferential standard.170 In a change from the Omnibus Order, the FCC found
that the F-word’s use in the news program was not actionably indecent.171
Finally, several broadcasts of “NYPD Blue” were found to be indecent due
to the words “bullshit,” “dick” and “dickhead” being said numerous times.172
The FCC, however, reversed this ruling because they found that the complaint
was filed for episodes that aired after 10:00 p.m. and before 6:00 a.m.173

161. Id. at 13323 (reasoning that the comment did not reach an actionable level).
162. Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13324. (“The fact that she was not literally
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the use of the term
from the realm of descriptions or depictions. This case thus illustrates the difficulty in making the
distinction between expletives on the one hand and descriptions or depictions on the other.”).
163. Id. (“As reviewed above, Commission dicta and Bureau-level decisions issued before
our Golden Globe decision had suggested that expletives had to be repeated to be indecent but
that such a repetition requirement would not apply to descriptions or depictions of sexual or
excretory functions.”).
164. Id. at 13304.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 13305.
167. Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13326.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 13328. (“In today's Order, we reaffirm our commitment to proceeding with
caution in our evaluation of complaints involving news programming.”).
170. Id. at 13327. (“In the Omnibus Order, we “recognize[d] the need for caution with
respect to complaints implicating the editorial judgment of broadcast licensees in presenting news
and public affairs programming, as these matters are at the core of the First Amendment's free
press guarantee.”).
171. Id. at 13328.
172. Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2696.
173. See Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13329-30.
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Therefore, they fell in the safe harbor zone protected by the First
Amendment.174
With the Remand Order released as the updated FCC policy, Fox
petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on November 8, 2006, to
review the Remand Order.175 Fox also consolidated the appeal with another
one pending before the court.176 Finally, CBS and NBC successfully filed
motions to intervene.177 With all of the confusion regarding the flurry of FCC
indecency policies, this was the time for the Second Circuit to clarify the law
for broadcasters. Unfortunately, the court’s decision was ultimately a shortterm solution to a long term issue.
IV. FOX V. FCC
The networks (Fox, CBS and NBC) raised several arguments against the
validity of the FCC’s Remand Order. These arguments included:
(1) the Remand Order is arbitrary and capricious because the Commission’s
regulation of “fleeting expletives” represents a dramatic change in agency
policy without adequate explanation; (2) the FCC’s “community standards”
analysis is arbitrary and meaningless; (3) the FCC’s indecency findings are
invalid because the Commission made no finding of scienter; (4) the FCC’s
definition of “profane” is contrary to law; (5) the FCC’s indecency regime is
unconstitutionally vague; (6) the FCC’s indecency test permits the
Commission to make subjective determinations about the quality of speech in
violation of the First Amendment; and (7) the FCC’s indecency regime is an
impermissible content-based regulation of speech that violates the First
178
Amendment.

The court found the first argument persuasive and therefore did not reach any
of the other claims made by the networks.179
A.

The Majority Opinion

The court began by looking at the Administrative Procedure Act.180 Under
this Act, courts are to set agency decisions aside if found to be “arbitrary,

174. See id. at 13329.
175. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Fox, 489 F.3d at 454. 5 U.S.C. § 706 states:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”181
Agency action is considered arbitrary and capricious:
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
182
of the product of agency expertise.

The networks argued that the FCC’s change in policy for fleeting expletives, as
supported in the Remand Order, was arbitrary and capricious for its lack of
reasoned explanation.183
The court looked to past decisions to determine whether there was a
change in the FCC’s policy toward fleeting expletives.184 After a brief
analysis, the court agreed with the networks that “there is no question that the
FCC has changed its policy.”185 While agencies can change their policies, this
change must be accompanied by “reasoned analysis for departing from prior

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 455. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Fox, 489 F.3d at 455.
First, there is no question that the FCC has changed its policy. As outlined in detail above,
prior to the Golden Globes decision the FCC had consistently taken the view that isolated,
non-literal, fleeting expletives did not run afoul of its indecency regime. See, e.g., Pacifica
Clarification Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, at 4 n. 1 (advising broadcasters that “it would be
inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language” that occurred
during a live broadcast without an opportunity for journalistic editing); Application of
WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, at 10 & n. 6 (distinguishing between the “verbal
shock treatment” of the George Carlin monologue and “the isolated use of a potentially
offensive word” and finding that the single use of an expletive in a program “should not
call for us to act under the holding of Pacifica”); Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R.
2698, at 13 (“If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe that under
the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently
offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.” (emphasis added)); Industry
Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at 17–18 (distinguishing between material that is repeated or
dwelled on and material that is “fleeting and isolated”) (citing L.M. Communications of
S.C., Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 1595 (Mass Media Bureau 1992) (finding the single utterance of
“mother-fucker” not indecent because it was a “fleeting and isolated utterance which,
within the context of live and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Commission
sanction”); Lincoln Dellar, For Renewal of the Licenses of Stations KPRL(AM) and
KDDB(FM), 8 F.C.C.R. 2582 (Audio Serv. Div.1993) (news announcer's remark that he
“fucked that one up” not indecent because the “use of a single expletive” did not warrant
further review “in light of the isolated and accidental nature of the broadcast”)). This
consistent enforcement policy changed with the issuance of Golden Globes.

Id.
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precedent.”186 If an agency fails to do so, the agency’s action could be set
aside as arbitrary and capricious.187
The FCC’s primary explanation for the change in policy toward fleeting
expletives was the ‘first blow’ theory.188 This theory was outlined in the
original Pacifica Supreme Court decision.189 In Pacifica, the Court found that
broadcast media, unlike other types of speech, enters the privacy of the home
without warning.190 There, the Court rejected the argument that one could just
turn off the radio if offensive material was being broadcast.191 The Court
likened that argument to “saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow.”192 Similarly, the FCC argued here that “fleeting
expletives unfairly forces viewers to take the first blow.”193 The Second
Circuit did not accept this explanation as being a reasoned enough basis for the
FCC’s change in policy.194
The majority found that this ‘first blow’ theory was contrary to the FCC’s
policy for fleeting expletives.195 The inconsistency was located in an FCC
exception where some fleeting expletives were considered actionably indecent
in certain broadcasts but not in others. In the Remand Order, the FCC found
the statement “I knew he was a bullshitter from day one” to not be actionable
because it was said in a news program.196 The FCC has also held that
expletives aired during the movie Saving Private Ryan197 were not indecent

186. Id. at 456. The court explains what is necessary for reasoned analysis:
When an agency reverses its course, a court must satisfy itself that the agency knows it is
changing course, has given sound reasons for the change, and has shown that the rule is
consistent with the law that gives the agency its authority to act. In addition, the agency
must consider reasonably obvious alternatives and, if it rejects those alternatives, it must
give reasons for the rejection, sufficient to allow for meaningful judicial review. (quoting
N.Y. Council, Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502,
508 (2d Cir.1985)).

Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 457.
189. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
190. Fox, 489 F.3d at 457 (describing the majority opinion in Pacifica).
191. Id. at 457–58.
192. Id. (“To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears
indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow.”) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748).
193. Id. at 458 (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13309).
194. See id. at 459.
195. Fox, 489 F.3d at 459.
196. Id. at 458. (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13326). See also infra notes
212–16 along with accompanying text.
197. Saving Private Ryan is an explicitly graphic movie depicting World War II. Directed by
Steven Spielberg, this movie won five academy awards in 1998. The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120815/ awards.
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because of their importance to the artistic nature of the work.198 However, at
both the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards, the use of the word “shit”
was actionably indecent.199 In all of these scenarios, the listener was forced to
suffer the ‘first blow’ from the broadcasted expletive.200 The inconsistency,
the majority pointed out, was that only in certain circumstances was that ‘first
blow’ considered actionably indecent.201
The FCC’s defense was that they wanted to protect viewers from being
forced to hear these expletives.202 The majority reasoned that if this were the
case, why were fleeting expletives considered perfectly acceptable in certain
Viewers, especially children, may not be able to
circumstances?203
differentiate when an expletive is used for an exception listed above.204 The
majority concluded that this lenient policy did not comport with the ‘first
blow’ theory205 and that the FCC’s “proffered rationale [was] disconnected
from the actual policy implemented by the Commission.”206
The FCC also defended its policy that the F-word and S-word are
presumptively indecent. The FCC argued that even non-literal expletives were
indecent due to the “difficult[y] to distinguish whether a word is being used as
an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or excretory functions.”207 The
majority rejected this argument as contrary to common sense.208 Pointing to
several examples, the court illustrated that in numerous circumstances, a
reasonable person would be able to know if the language referred to sexual
activities or excretory organs.209
The FCC claimed that the requirement of repeated use of expletives
ignored the critical nature of context and that if a per se exemption of fleeting
expletives were instituted, the result would be a significant increase in their use
in future broadcasts.210 The majority pointed out that the FCC failed to

198. Fox, 489 F.3d at 458. See Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding
Their Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network’s Presentation of the
Film “Saving Private Ryan,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4507 (2005).
199. Id. See also supra notes 159–66 along with accompanying text.
200. Id. at 459.
201. Id. at 458.
202. See id.
203. Fox, 489 F.3d at 458. (highlighting the different treatment between Saving Private Ryan
and the 2002 and 2003 Music Billboard Awards).
204. Id. at 459.
205. Id. (“Thus, the record simply does not support the position that the Commission’s new
policy was based on its concern with the public’s mere exposure to this language on the
airwaves.”).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13308).
208. Fox, 489 F.3d at 459.
209. See id. at 459–60.
210. Id. at 460 (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13309).
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provide convincing evidence that this increase would likely occur.211 The
court even brought up an admission by the FCC acknowledging that fleeting
expletives “never barraged the airwaves” before the Golden Globes
decision.212 While the majority did agree with the FCC that the nature of
context is critical, the court criticized the FCC for not taking context into
consideration when declaring that all variants of certain words would be
presumptively indecent.213
The majority finally found that the FCC failed to explain why they enacted
this new policy after nearly thirty years of precedent.214 The FCC claimed a
primary interest in protecting children from indecent broadcasts.215 The
majority, however, argued that this intention has remained the same since
Pacifica was decided.216 Despite this continued interest, the FCC failed to
explain how a fleeting expletive is harmful and why there was a need to
regulate its use.217 Because the FCC failed to justify its changed policy
regarding fleeting expletives, the court held that the Golden Globes decision,
as applied in the Remand Order, was invalid under the Administrative
Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious.218 The Remand Order was thereby
vacated and the matter was sent back to the FCC.219
B.

Majority Opinion’s Dicta

Recognizing the narrow scope of the holding, the court spent considerable
time analyzing potential constitutional challenges as dicta. While the dictum
lacks the weight of the holding, the majority made several observations which
could aid judicial efficiency if further litigation ensued.220 The court
immediately announced their skepticism about whether the FCC would be able
to create a reasoned explanation regarding their policy for fleeting
expletives.221

211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Fox, 489 F.3d at 460 (referencing the FCC’s standard that the words “fuck” and “shit”
are presumptively indecent).
214. See id. at 461.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 462.
218. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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Generally, regulations of speech that are protected by the First Amendment
must withstand strict scrutiny.222 There is, however, an exception for
broadcast media, requiring only that the regulation be “narrowly tailored to
further a substantial government interest.”223 While the Supreme Court has
approved the FCC’s ability to regulate indecent material, the FCC’s indecency
standard has been attacked as “undefined, indiscernible, inconsistent, and
consequently, unconstitutionally vague.”224 Detailing the inconsistencies of
the FCC’s indecency policy, the court made it clear that they were sympathetic
to the argument that the policy was not narrowly tailored.225 The court also
looked to Reno v. ACLU,226 a 1997 Supreme Court decision that dealt with an
indecency regulation for the internet.227 This similarly worded regulation228
was found to have violated the First Amendment since it was too vague and “it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to
constitutional protection.”229 While internet regulations are different from
broadcast regulations, the court mentioned their skepticism that the FCC’s
indecency standard could survive a similar constitutional attack.230 The
majority also found potential constitutional issues with the subjectivity of the
FCC’s ability to sanction speech,231 the level of scrutiny used,232 and the

222. Id. at 462–63. For strict scrutiny, “the government must both identify a compelling
interest for any regulation it may impose on indecent speech and choose the least restrictive
means to further that interest”. Id. at 463.
223. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462-63. Broadcast media is an exception because it is uniquely
pervasive. See also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. See id. The court looks to the differential treatment between Saving Private Ryan and
the 2002 and 2003 Music Billboard Awards to highlight the potential vagueness of the standard.
Id.
226. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The Court stuck down an internet indecency
regulation for being unconstitutionally vague. Id.
227. Fox, 489 F.3d at 463.
228. The regulation covered speech that “in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.” Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 464.
231. See id. (“The Supreme Court has cautioned against speech regulations that give too
much discretion to government officials.”) (quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992)).
232. Id. (“We recognize there is some tension in the law regarding the appropriate level of
First Amendment scrutiny.”). Currently, the court doesn’t use strict scrutiny for media
broadcasts. However, the networks argue that perhaps strict scrutiny should be used. While
broadcast media is not as uniquely pervasive as it used to be, current constitutional precedent has
established that broadcast media faces an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. at 465.
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FCC’s construction of the word ‘profane.’233 After this discussion, the court
concluded that it is “doubtful that by merely proffering a reasoned analysis for
its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can adequately
respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the
networks.”234
C. Dissenting Opinion
In Judge Leval’s dissent, he argued that the FCC satisfied its requirement
by giving adequate reasoning for changes under the Administrative Procedure
Act.235 Ultimately, Judge Leval found that the FCC “gave a sensible, although
not necessarily compelling, reason” for the change in policy regarding fleeting
expletives.236 The FCC reasoned that the F-word “is one of the most vulgar,
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language”
and that “its use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image.”237 Thus, its use,
even if isolated, violated § 1464.238 This explanation, the Judge argued, should
be enough to satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.239
Judge Leval next addressed the argument that the FCC’s standard lacked
consistency.240 Acknowledging that the new policy did not follow an all-ornothing policy,241 Judge Leval pointed out that the FCC is applying standards
based on the context of the broadcast.242 Thus, the policy actually increased
the consistency of FCC rulings by drawing clear lines for specific contexts.243
The majority argued that the FCC was “divorced from reality” when they
claimed that a major increase of expletives would occur without the
implementation of their new policy.244 The dissent argued that these are just
two different predictions and that the court must be deferential to the agency’s
judgment.245

233. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 465–66. The court suggests that the FCC’s use of profane may
have difficulty passing constitutional muster. This is due to the FCC’s current interpretation of
profane meaning essentially the same thing as indecent. Id.
234. Id. at 467.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 469.
237. Id. at 470 (citing Golden Globes II, supra note 13 at 4979).
238. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 470; § 1464, supra note 20.
239. Fox, 489 F.3d at 470.
240. Id. at 471.
241. Fleeting expletives that are integral to a piece of work or that occur on a bona fide news
program could be excused whereas the same expletive on a regular broadcast would be
considered indecent. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Fox, 489 F.3d at 460.
245. Id. at 472. Judge Leval even goes on to say that the FCC’s prediction is probably more
accurate.
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Finally, the dissent addressed the FCC’s argument that the F-word
communicates “inherently. . . sexual connotation [and] invariably invokes a
coarse sexual image.”246 Judge Leval agreed with the majority that the F-word
can be used without referring to sexual activities.247 However, he stressed that
the majority misinterpreted the FCC’s reasoning.248 A correct reasoning, he
argued, was that “even when the speaker does not intend a sexual meaning, a
substantial part of the community, and of the television audience, will
understand the word as freighted with an offensive sexual connotation.”249
Therefore, given the nature of the F-word, this interpretation of the FCC policy
was not irrational, arbitrary or capricious.250 After analyzing these multiple
factors, Judge Leval concluded that the FCC had a reasoned explanation for
their changed policy regarding fleeting expletives.251
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FOX DECISION
The decision in Fox v. FCC failed to answer many questions that had
plagued broadcasters since the FCC began cracking down on indecent
broadcasts. While the court came to a logical conclusion, the majority opinion
failed to adequately address the true issue of whether a fleeting expletive could
ever be constitutionally regulated. As a result of the court’s decision, many
broadcasters were left confused regarding what constituted an acceptable
broadcast.
This analysis will begin with a discussion of the majority and dissenting
opinion in Fox v. FCC. Specifically, I will address the following issues: the
‘first blow’ theory, the presumptive indecency of the F-word and S-word, and
the policy regarding fleeting expletives. This discussion will include a short
recap of the court’s findings and examine whether the court’s conclusions were
logical.

First, the words proscribed by the Commission’s decency standards are much more
common in daily discourse today than they were thirty years ago. Second the regulated
networks compete for audience with the unregulated cabel channels, which increasingly
make liberal use of their freedom to fill programming with such expletives. The media
press regularly reports how difficult it is for networks to compete with cable for that
reason. It seems to me the agency has good reason to expect that a marked increase
would occur if the old policy were continued.
Id. at 472–73.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 473. Judge Leval lists several examples where the word “fuck” was not used
literally. “A student who gets a disappointing grade on a test, a cook who burns the roast, or a
driver who returns to his parked car to find a parking ticket on the windshield.” Id.
248. Fox, 489 F.3d at 473.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 474.
251. Id.
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‘First Blow’ Theory

The majority reasoned that the FCC’s policy was incompatible with the
‘first blow’ theory because under certain circumstances, fleeting expletives
were acceptable for some broadcasts while in others, the same words were
considered indecent.252 Originating from the Pacifica decision, the ‘first blow’
theory emphasized that in the privacy of the home, one has the right to be left
alone from indecent material.253 Here, the majority ignored the initial critical
question of whether the material was indecent. When determining indecency,
both the Supreme Court and the FCC have made it clear that context is an
important consideration.254 The FCC has found that expletives used in bona
fide news programming or expletives which are integral to a piece of work are
generally outside of the definition of indecent material.255 Therefore, the use of
these words in these particular contexts falls outside the ‘first blow’ theory
because the use of the words was not indecent. Curiously, the majority
appeared to ignore this contextual analysis. Instead, the majority focused on
how viewers may lack the requisite understanding that the expletives were
integral or part of a news program. Regardless of the validity of this claim, the
‘first blow’ theory emphasizes that an individual in the privacy of his own
home only has the right to be left alone from indecent material. The majority
mistakenly combined both decent and indecent broadcasts when finding the
FCC policy to be inconsistent. However, when separated properly, the ‘first
blow’ theory used by the FCC is consistent in that the FCC regulates
broadcasts so that listeners are not forced to withstand indecent material.
As the dissent illustrates, this approach is an attempt by the FCC to
reconcile conflicting values.256 Without a flexible approach focused on the
context of the broadcast, the FCC’s approach would have to follow an all-ornothing standard. After all, if one word was determined to be indecent, its use
at any time outside of the safe harbor period of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. would
not be acceptable regardless of its context. This sort of policy is contrary to
both the FCC’s policy and the past precedent of the Supreme Court.
B.

Presumptive Indecency of the F-word and S-word

While the majority incorrectly analyzed the ‘first blow’ theory, it correctly
pointed out the logical inconsistency in the FCC’s finding that the F-word and
the S-word are presumptively indecent.257 The use of the F-word and S-word

252. See id. at 457–58.
253. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
254. See id. at 742–43. See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8002.
255. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
256. Fox, 489 F.3d at 472.
257. The FCC found that the F-word and S-word are presumptively indecent because it is
“difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether a word is being used as an expletive or as a
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can vary greatly in meaning, depending on the context. For example, Bono’s
statement “really, really, fucking brilliant” is a clear, non-literal use of the
word “fuck.” As the Bureau initially contended, this word was used as an
adjective or intensifier.258 Even in the review of the Golden Globes decision,
the FCC stated that the “full context in which the material appeared is critically
important.”259 By having a list of presumptively indecent words, the FCC’s
policy altogether ignores the importance of context when determining whether
material is indecent.
The dissent argued that the F-word and S-word is loaded with an offensive
sexual or excretory connotation and that no matter the literal or non-literal use,
viewers will understand it as such.260 This interpretation is too general to be
applicable. In numerous examples, a reasonable person would be able to
conclude that the F-word or S-word is used non-literally. The FCC’s broad
generalization of these words could lead to suppression of protected speech.
The FCC’s policy is also contrary to past precedent. In Pacifica, the
Supreme Court found George Carlin’s monologue to be indecent because of
the “repetitive, deliberate use” of certain words.261 Several Bureau decisions
later relied on this precedent.262 Shortly after Pacifica, the Bureau made it
clear that material believed to be offensive by some is not enough to warrant
regulation.263 In 2001, the FCC issued a Policy Statement to help broadcasters
understand what the FCC found to be indecent.264 In one included example,
the F-word was used.265 The FCC found that this single usage of the F-word
was just a fleeting expletive and that, given the context, was not indecent.266
While this policy changed in the Golden Globes decision, the explanation for
that change lacked a reasonable basis. As mentioned above, common sense
and context dictate the meaning behind the uses of these so called
presumptively indecent words. Therefore, this component of the FCC policy
was arbitrary and capricious.
C. Fleeting Expletives
The majority also rejected the FCC’s argument that a per se exemption on
fleeting expletives would result in a significant increase in their use during

literal description of sexual or excretory functions.” Id. at 459 (quoting Remand Order, supra
note 157, at 13308).
258. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19861.
259. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4977–78.
260. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 473.
261. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978).
262. See WGBH, supra note 78, at 1251.
263. Id.
264. Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 7999.
265. Id. at 8009.
266. Id.
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future broadcasts.267 The Remand Order provided no information indicating
that fleeting expletives were harmful to viewers.268 In fact, no evidence was
given indicating that an increase was likely to occur.269 The dissent correctly
noted that these predictions are speculative at best.270 Nevertheless, the FCC’s
concern that excessive fleeting expletives will flood the airwaves lacks
particular merit. Even if the FCC is correct, an increase in fleeting expletives
could take their use out of the realm of fleeting altogether. If numerous
controversial words were said during a broadcast, the FCC could look to the
context of the entire broadcast and find that the language was not fleeting, but
rather, that a pattern permeated the program. This type of scenario would
make the broadcast actionably indecent.
For the twenty-five years before the review of the Golden Globes decision,
both the courts and the FCC had a clear policy that fleeting or isolated
expletives were generally not actionable. In Pacifica, the “repetitive,
deliberate use” of certain words was determined to be indecent.271 Justice
Powell, in his concurrence, distinguished the FCC’s power to regulate verbal
shock treatment found in Carlin’s monologue from isolated use of a potentially
offensive word.272 Shortly after Pacifica, the Enforcement Bureau rejected an
allegation that WGBH’s broadcasts were indecent.273 It reasoned that more
than just an expletive had to be found to warrant an indecent broadcast.274 In
1979, the Bureau found that an announcer repeatedly using variants of the Fword was not indecent because of its isolated use.275 In 1987, the
Reconsideration Order factored into its patently offensive analysis the question
of whether material was isolated or fleeting.276 In 2001, the FCC’s new Policy
Statement gave an example where a man said “mother-fucker” during a
broadcast.277 The FCC found this to be fleeting and isolated and not enough to
warrant a sanction.278 Finally, in 2003, Bono said “fucking brilliant” during
his acceptance speech at the Golden Globe Awards.279 The initial Enforcement
Bureau decision stated that this was not actionably indecent because it was

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 472.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978).
Id. at 760_61.
WGBH, supra note 75, at 1251.
Id.
WPFW, supra note 78, at 757.
Reconsideration Order, supra note 82, at 932.
Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009.
Id.
Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19859.
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fleeting and isolated and that the word was used as an intensifier.280 This
standard, which enjoyed a long line of precedent, was subsequently reversed in
the review of the Golden Globe decision.281
Because the Fox court correctly found that the F-word and S-word should
not be considered presumptively indecent, the FCC’s explanation for fleeting
expletives completely crumbles. The FCC can no longer claim that the use of
the F-word or S-word automatically is indecent and that their single use fulfills
the two prong indecency requirement.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
While policy considerations are important, the subtle, yet underlying
conflict lies in the broadcaster’s constitutional rights versus the FCC’s right to
regulate indecency. “The Constitution gives significant protection from
overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s vast and
privileged sphere.”282 In the dictum accompanying the decision in Fox, the
majority confessed their skepticism that the FCC could “provide a reasoned
explanation for its fleeting expletive regime that would pass constitutional
muster.”283 All indecent speech is protected under the First Amendment.284
The FCC, however, can regulate this speech if there is both a substantial
governmental interest and the FCC is utilizing the least restrictive means to
further that interest. The majority in Fox appeared sympathetic to an argument
that the FCC’s indecency test is overbroad.285 With so many caveats for when
certain expletives could be broadcast, the indecency standard lacked the clarity
constitutionally required by the First Amendment.286 In Reno v. ACLU, a
regulation similarly worded to the FCC’s indecency standard was found to
violate the First Amendment because of its indirect effect on speech.287 Like
Reno, the FCC’s vague and overbroad standard could violate the First
Amendment by effectively silencing speech that is entitled to protection.
The court should have used this constitutional approach when deciding the
outcome of this case. During oral arguments, the court was fully briefed on the

280. Id. at 19862.
281. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4982.
282. Ian J. Antonoff, You Don’t Like It . . . Change the (Expletive Deleted) Channel!: An
Analysis of the Constitutional Issues that Plague FCC Enforcement Actions and a Proposal for
Deregulation in Favor of Direct Consumer Control, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 253,
263 (2005).
283. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 463. The networks contend that the FCC indecency test “is undefined,
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague.” Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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constitutional issues regarding the updated FCC policy.288 Rather than rule on
constitutional grounds, the court found that the FCC violated the
Administrative Procedure Act.289
The majority’s conclusion was problematic in that the FCC could have
revisited the Remand Order and created a more reasonable explanation for
their altered policy, satisfying the requirements laid out in the Administrative
Procedure Act. If this scenario had hypothetically occurred, the broadcasters
would have been in the same position that they were pre-Fox. The networks
would then put forth the same argument that the FCC’s policy violated their
rights. The majority’s dictum indicated that a change to the FCC’s reasoning
would likely not be enough to survive constitutional scrutiny.290 This warning
by the court, however, was not enough. Assume the FCC had come up with a
new explanation for their change in policy. The result would have meant
significant confusion among the broadcasting community. Broadcasters would
have had to decide whether to follow the new FCC policy or rely on a potential
constitutional claim that the FCC was exceeding their power to regulate
broadcasts.
Had the Supreme Court not granted certiorari, broadcaster confusion
coupled with increasing fines for indecency could have led to a chilling effect
on protected speech. This is because broadcasters could become hesitant to
release material which might be considered indecent because of the threat of
significant fines.291 This also could lead to others not speaking on the air for
fear of penalty.292 Furthermore, news programming and informational
broadcasts could have faced more scrutiny by editors which could have led to
distorted information.293 It goes against a good public policy of encouraging a
variety of ideas.294 Each of these possible scenarios would have negatively
affected both networks and viewers. This subtle assault on the freedom of
speech would not have gone unnoticed by the networks.
The Fox court stated that “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in
advance of the necessity of deciding them.”295 The court failed to recognize
that the FCC and broadcasting industry had hit a crossroads where fundamental
questions arose to the legality of the FCC policies. For resolution of these
issues, it was necessary for the court to determine the constitutionality of the
288. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 462. (“We are skeptical that the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation
for its ‘fleeting expletive’ regime that would pass constitutional muster.”).
291. Fallow, supra note 9, at 30.
292. Antonoff, supra note 282, at 264.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462.
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FCC’s regulatory policies. Since this was not accomplished, the scenario that
these same parties would meet in the courtroom was inevitable.
VII. SUPREME COURT GETS INVOLVED
Inevitable it was. Rather than create a new explanation on remand or
request an en banc rehearing, the FCC appealed directly to the Supreme
Court.296 On March 17, 2008, the Supreme Court granted the Solicitor
General’s petition for certiorari.297 With oral arguments by the parties
scheduled for fall of 2008, the Supreme Court appears poised to provide the
clarity that the Second Circuit decision failed to impart. First, I will outline the
arguments that the FCC, Fox and NBC provided in their certiorari petitions on
why Fox v. FCC should or should not be revisited. Then, I will discuss these
positions and analyze some possible scenarios and outcomes that could take
place when the Supreme Court hears this case.
After a weak decision in Fox and the continued confusion that has ensued,
it is essential that the Supreme Court address the substantive challenges to the
controversial FCC policy to get to the heart of the FCC’s authority to regulate
fleeting expletives. Otherwise, broadcasters will continue to question what
constitutes an acceptable broadcast. With an increasingly vigilant eye towards
punishment and ever-increasing fines for indecent broadcasts, the result could
lead to the suppression of protected speech out of a fear for potential indecency
findings.
A.

FCC’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Granted

The question presented by the FCC to the Supreme Court was “whether the
court of appeals erred in striking down the Federal Communications
Commission’s determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may
violate federal restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or
profane language,’ when the expletives are not repeated.”298 The FCC
proffered three reasons why the Supreme Court’s review was warranted.299

296. Brief in Opposition of Respondents, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2008 WL
320502 at *14 (Feb. 1, 2008).
297. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008).
298. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2007 WL 3231567
at *1 (Nov. 1, 2007).
299. Id.
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1. The Decision in Fox v. FCC Conflicted With the “Context Driven
Approach Governing Broadcast Indecency” Upheld in the Supreme
Court Decision in Pacifica.
The FCC first argued that the Second Circuit failed to adequately take a
broadcast’s context into consideration.300 Countervailing interests, such as
First Amendment concerns, have led the FCC to not penalize the use of the Fword during bona fide news programming.301 This contextually based
exception is premised on the notion that First Amendment concerns force the
FCC to “proceed with the utmost restraint.”302
The Pacifica decision focused on the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent
broadcasts.303 Justice Stevens emphasized that “we must consider [a
broadcast’s] context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action
was constitutionally permissible.”304 In Fox, the court found that the ‘first
blow’ theory of protecting broadcast audiences did not comport with the FCC’s
contextual approach to fleeting expletives.305 The FCC claimed that this
conflicts with the Pacifica decision, in which the Supreme Court recognized
the ‘first blow’ theory while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of
context.306 The FCC pointed out that “[o]nce it is recognized that (1) a
particular graphic utterance can service as a ‘first blow’ that can cause
immediate damage, and (2) context matters, it follows logically that there is no
mandate for a per se rule of either prohibition or license.”307 The FCC tried to
take context into consideration for those words they deemed could “serve as a
‘first blow.’”308 The Second Circuit’s decision, the FCC argued, failed to
recognize this necessary contextual component and therefore was contrary to
the Pacifica decision.309
2. The Second Circuit’s Decision was “Inconsistent with Settled
Principles of Administrative Law and Conflicts with a Decision of the
D.C. Circuit.”
The Second Circuit found that the FCC violated the Administrative
Procedure Act by failing to give a reasoned basis for its change in policy
regarding fleeting expletives.310 The Second Circuit maintained that the FCC
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id.
See Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *17.
Id. (quoting Justice Stevens in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978)).
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 2007).
See Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *18.
Id. at *19.
See id.
Id.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

416

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII:383

needed to explain “why it has changed its perception that a fleeting expletive
was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for the nearly thirty years between Pacifica and
Golden Globes.”311 The FCC defended their policy as another step in
protecting children from indecent broadcasts.312 The Second Circuit, however,
wanted “record evidence” to support their contentions.313 The FCC countered,
arguing that this requirement was above and beyond what was necessary under
the Administrative Procedure Act.314 The FCC pointed to previous decisions
that found that an “agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change,
either with or without a change in circumstances”315 and that an agency may
reconsider “the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”316 Therefore, an
agency may rationally change their policy if the “prior policy failed to
implement properly the statute.”317 The FCC argued that their change in policy
regarding fleeting expletives was in recognition that their prior policy failed to
adequately implement § 1464.318 Also, in Action for Children’s Television v.
FCC, the court stated, “the Supreme Court has never suggested that a scientific
demonstration of psychological harm is required in order to establish the
constitutionality of measures protecting minors from exposure to indecent
speech.”319 The FCC contended that the Second Circuit’s requirement for
record evidence in addition to a fuller explanation to their change in a thirty
year policy was more than was required under the Administrative Procedure
Act.320
3. Importance of the Question Presented
The FCC acknowledged that generally, when a case is remanded back to
an agency, such a decision does not usually warrant the Supreme Court’s
review.321 However, this situation, the FCC claimed, presented a unique set of
facts.322 The FCC argued that they had already fully explained their reasoning
for changing their policy.323 Not only this, but the Second Circuit indicated
311. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *21.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at *22 (quoting State Farm v., 463 U.S. 29, 57 1983)).
316. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *22 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981).
317. Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1990)).
318. Id. (Argued that the problem was that “it rested on an ‘artificial’ distinction between
‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory activity’ that ignored the fact
that ‘an expletive’s power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.”).
319. Id. at 23 (quoting Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
320. See id. at 21–23.
321. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *26.
322. See id.
323. Id.
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their belief that the FCC would not be able to adequately respond to the court’s
concerns on remand.324 This put the FCC in a no-win situation. Additionally,
the decision in Fox struck down the FCC’s policy, effectively instituting a per
se exemption for fleeting expletives.325 The FCC claimed that:
at a minimum, the decision of the court of appeals is likely to generate
considerable confusion for the commission- which has pending before it
hundreds of thousands of complaints regarding the broadcast of expletives,
both isolated and repeated- and for broadcasters, leaving them uncertain as to
the standards that are to govern the Commission’s enforcement of the statutory
326
prohibition on broadcast indecency.

Without a clear avenue for clarification through the Second Circuit, the FCC
argued that the Supreme Court should get involved.327
B.

Fox’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Denied

The question presented by Fox to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether the
court of appeals correctly held as a matter of administrative law that the FCC
failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversing its long-standing indecency
enforcement policy with respect to isolated and fleeting expletives.”328 Fox
offered three reasons why the Supreme Court should deny the petition.329
1. There is No Conflict Between the Second Circuit’s Decision and
Pacifica
Fox immediately pointed out that the Supreme Court has never ruled on
the issue of the FCC’s authority to regulate fleeting expletives under § 1464.330
In Pacifica, the Court explicitly stated that “[w]e have not decided that an
occasional expletive . . .would justify any sanction.”331 In Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion, he stated that “[t]he Commission’s holding, and certainly
the Court’s holding today, does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of
a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast.”332 The FCC
argued that the majority in Fox rejected the “context-driven approach
governing indecency that this Court upheld in Pacifica.”333 Fox rejected this
324. Id.
325. Id. at *27.
326. Petition for Writ 2007 WL 3231567 at *30.
327. Id.
328. Brief in Opposition of Respondents, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2008 WL
320502 at *1 (Feb. 1 2008).
329. Id.
330. Id. at *10.
331. Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978)).
332. Id. (quoting Justice Powell, Concurring Opinion in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760–
61).
333. Brief in Opposition, 2008 WL 320502 at *11.
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contention by arguing that the decision in Fox was “simply a garden-variety
remand for lack of explanation; it contains no substantive holding with respect
to ‘context.’”334 The Fox court found that “the Commission’s proffered
rationale [first blow theory] is disconnected from the actual policy
implemented by the Commission.”335 The principle behind the ‘first blow’
theory, that individuals should not be forced to withstand the initial blow of
indecent language, failed to mesh with the policy where numerous ‘blows’
were permitted.336 A reasoned explanation for the FCC’s change in policy is
especially important because the regulation strikes at the heart of the First
Amendment.337 When little to no explanation is given, confusion and selfcensorship could permeate the networks.338 Since the Second Circuit
remanded the case back to the FCC on administrative grounds, Fox argued that
Pacifica was neither implicated nor contradicted.339
2. “The Second Circuit’s Decision is Consistent With Settled Principles
of Administrative Law and Does Not Conflict with Action for
Children’s Television”
“The Process by which [an agency] reaches [its decreed] result must be
logical and rational. Courts enforce this principle with regularity when they set
aside agency regulations which. . .are not supported by the reason that the
agencies adduce.”340 Fox asserted that the Second Circuit appropriately
applied the legal principles found in the Administrative Procedure Act.341 The
court reviewed and rejected the FCC’s change of policy because it failed to
give a reasoned explanation for its departure from past precedent.342 Fox
argued that this was standard judicial protocol.343
The FCC argued that the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with the
decision in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC.344 The D.C. Circuit Court
did not require Congress to present record evidence that minors were being
harmed from “exposure to sexually explicit material.”345 Fox distinguished
this case for two reasons. First, “ACT [Action for Children’s Television]

334. Id.
335. Id. (citation omitted).
336. See id. at 11–12. (These permitted blows are the examples of the F-word being used in
Saving Private Ryan and a Bona Fide News Program without being considered indecent.).
337. Id. at *13.
338. Brief in Opposition, 2008 WL 320502 at *13.
339. See id. at **13–14.
340. Id. at *15.
341. See id. at **14–15.
342. Id. at *16.
343. Brief in Opposition, 2008 WL 320502 at *15.
344. See id.
345. Id. at *16.
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involved a constitutional challenge to a speech regulation.”346 Here, the issue
was administrative. Second, the decision in ACT dealt with “hard-core
pornography- not isolated words.”347 Therefore, the decision by the Second
Circuit, Fox argued, was consistent with both administrative law and past
precedent.348
Fox’s final argument was that the remand does not warrant Supreme Court
review.349 This argument, however, failed to gain traction with the Supreme
Court.
C. NBC’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Denied
The question presented by NBC to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether the
court of appeals erred in holding that the Commission had failed to explain
adequately the abrupt reversal of its longstanding determination that fleeting
and isolated utterances of expletives generally fall outside the Commission’s
definition of broadcast indecency.”350 NBC proffered three reasons why the
Supreme Court should deny the petition.351
1. “The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied This Court’s Administrative
Law Precedents”
NBC argued that there was no conflict between the FCC and the Second
Circuit on whether the correct legal standard was applied.352 Rather, the
conflict arose out of a disagreement on whether the explanation given by the
FCC was adequate.353 This explanation, NBC claimed, had to be provided by
the agency because “[c]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc
rationalizations for agency action.”354 NBC pointed to the Remand Order and
the FCC’s initial insistence that there was never a policy change regarding

346. Id. at **16–17.
347. Id. at *17.
348. See Brief in Opposition., 2008 WL 320502 at **14–17.
349. Id. at **18–22. Fox argued that the FCC incorrectly read the Second Circuit’s decision
as a substantive holding that prohibits the regulation of fleeting expletives. Rather, the case was
remanded back to the FCC to come up with a reasoned explanation for their change in policy. A
review by the Supreme Court, Fox argued, would be premature because the Second Circuit has
not ruled on any of the “substantive challenges” to the FCC indecency policy. If the FCC could
create a reasoned explanation for their policy change, the Second Circuit would address these
substantive issues first. Fox also argued that the Supreme Court should wait until a circuit
conflict occurs. By remaining patient, the Supreme Court may be in a better position to grant
certiorari.
350. Brief in Opposition of NBC, et al., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2008 WL
320501 at *1.
351. Id.
352. Id. at* 15.
353. Id. at *16.
354. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50).
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fleeting expletives.355 The FCC reasoned that the F-word should be considered
presumptively indecent because “[g]iven the core meaning of the F-word, any
use of that word has a sexual connotation even if it is not used literally.”356
NBC argued that the FCC failed to “explain how the F-word came to develop
the ‘core meaning’ the Commission never seemed to discern before” and to
“justify its conclusion with reasoned argument and evidence.”357 Without the
requirement of proper explanation, the FCC could redefine words on a whim
without any limit to their power.358
NBC also pointed out that the Remand Order was “devoid of any evidence
that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone establishes that this harm
is serious enough to warrant government regulation.”359 Distinguishing this
case from Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, NBC argued that “it was in
that context that the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that the Commission
was required to demonstrate that indecent speech caused harm to minors.”360
Without a reasoned basis behind the FCC’s change in policy, NBC argued that
no error was committed in remanding the case back to the FCC.361
2. There is No Conflict With This Court’s Decision in Pacifica
Similarly to the petition by Fox, NBC highlighted how the decision in
Pacifica had “not decided that an occasional expletive. . .would justify any
sanction.”362 That issue has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court.363 NBC
also argued that the First Amendment holding in Pacifica “is not even
implicated here because the court of appeals did not reach the broadcasters’
First Amendment challenge.”364 Nevertheless, the FCC claimed that the
Second Circuit’s decision conflicted directly with the “context-driven
approach” found in Pacifica.365 NBC argued that there were two flaws in this
argument. First, “Pacifica did not announce ‘the context-driven approach
governing broadcast indecency’ that the Commission says it did.”366 There
was no disagreement, as in Fox, over whether the language used was “patently
offensive.”367 Rather, “context was relevant in Pacifica to determine whether

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *16.
Id. at *18.
Id. at **18–19.
See id. at **19–20.
Id. at *21.
Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *21.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *24 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978)).
Id.
Id. at *23.
Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *23.
Id. at *25.
Id.
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the sanction imposed on repeated, deliberately broadcast, and concededly
indecent speech violated the First Amendment.”368 NBC’s second argument
was that the Second Circuit’s decision does not prohibit the FCC from
considering the nature of the program when determining whether the broadcast
is patently offensive.369 The third factor in the patent offensiveness test is
“whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the
material appears to have been presented for its shock value.”370 For example,
certain broadcasts that show genitalia are not ‘patently offensive’ when shown
educationally.371 The ‘first blow’ theory does not address this contextual
analysis. The ‘first blow’ theory, NBC argued, failed to give adequate
reasoning for the abandonment of the second factor of the patent offensiveness
test which focused on “whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities.”372
NBC, like Fox, also failed to convince the court that the remand does not
warrant the Supreme Court’s review.373
As a validation to the confusion and problems resulting from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Fox, the Supreme Court announced their decision to grant
certiorari and review the case.374 While the Supreme Court is by no means
bound to the question presented and arguments found in the FCC’s petition,
these will serve as a guidepost for what the Court may be interested in hearing
during oral arguments next fall.
D. Issues the Supreme Court Will Likely Address
The FCC’s question presented to the Court was “[w]hether the court of
appeals erred in striking down the Federal Communications Commission’s
determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may violate federal

368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *25.
371. Id.
372. Id. at *26.
373. Id. at **26–32. NBC, like Fox, argued that the remand to the FCC gave the agency an
opportunity to come up with a reasoned explanation for their change in policy. Had the FCC
created a new reasoning, then the Second Circuit would have been able to review the substantive
challenges to the policy. Without any of these issues having been ruled on, the Supreme Court
would need to address “the broadcasters’ half-dozen alternative arguments that the court of
appeals found no occasion to resolve.” NBC argued that the issue of whether the “Commission’s
definition of indecent material is unconstitutionally indeterminate and vague” is particularly
noteworthy. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down a standard nearly identical to the
FCC’s indecency standard as “unconstitutionally vague.” NBC argued that the FCC’s indecency
standard could face a similar fate for being both a “vague and imperceptible standard.” Without
the Second Circuit having addressed any substantive issues in Fox, NBC argued that the Supreme
Court should deny immediate review.
374. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008).
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restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or profane language,’
when the expletives are not repeated.”375 The very fact that the Court granted
certiorari indicates some dissatisfaction toward the Second Circuit’s
decision.376 The Supreme Court will likely first address the Second Circuit’s
decision to remand the case for the FCC’s failure to satisfy the Administrative
Procedure Act. For the Supreme Court to adequately resolve the confusion
plaguing broadcasters and the FCC alike, the Court must determine whether
the FCC satisfied the Administrative Procedure Act or whether there are policy
considerations to bypass this administrative hurdle.
1. Administrative Procedure Act
“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”377
The FCC reasoned that their change in policy was based on the belief that the
F-word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual
activity in the English language” and that “its use invariably invokes a coarse
sexual image.”378 Therefore, its use, even if isolated, violated § 1464.379 The
FCC argued in their petition that an agency is permitted to change their policy
if the “prior policy failed to implement properly the statute.”380 Here, the FCC
determined that their pre-Golden Globes policy failed to adequately regulate
indecent speech because fleeting expletives received nearly a ‘free pass’ from
regulation.381 The networks, on the other hand, will contend that the change in
FCC policy was not accompanied by the requisite reasoned basis.382 The FCC
failed to give any explanation for their decision to overrule thirty years of
precedent.383 Also, the rationale for why the F-word and S-word became
presumptively indecent lacks common sense given the plethora of differing
definitions in differing contexts.384 Both the FCC and the network’s arguments
are persuasive. While the Second Circuit laid out a strong explanation for why
the FCC failed this administrative hurdle, the Supreme Court will most likely
give more deference to agency decision-making.

375. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *1.
376. Only four Justices need to agree to accept a case through a writ of certiorari.
377. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *20 (quoting Motor Vehicle v. State Farm, 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
378. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 470 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Golden
Globes II, supra note 13 at 4979).
379. See id. ; § 1464, supra note 20.
380. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at* 22.
381. See id.
382. See Brief in Opposition of Respondents, 2008 WL 320502 at *15.
383. Id. at *16.
384. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 2007).
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The Court might find alternative reasons to bypass the administrative
hurdle altogether. Despite its seemingly innocent logic, Fox and NBC harbor
an impractical view regarding the Second Circuit’s decision. Both networks
argued that the FCC should come up with a reasoned explanation for their
change in policy. If the FCC were to satisfactorily do this, the court would
move past the Administrative Procedure Act and would reach the substantive
challenges in this case. The problem with this logic is that it ignores the reality
of the Second Circuit’s position. In the dictum accompanying the Fox opinion,
the majority wrote “we are doubtful that by merely proffering a reasoned
analysis for its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can
adequately respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the
networks.”385 In the FCC’s petition for certiorari, the FCC outlines the
position the Fox court left them:
The court has thus sent the Commission back to run a Sisyphean errand while
effectively invalidating much of the Commission’s authority to enforce 18
U.S.C. 1464. In the meantime, the Commission is left in the untenable
position of having a grant of authority that the public expects it to exercise, and
that Pacifica allows it to exercise, but that the Second Circuit has indicated
cannot be meaningfully exercised consistently with that court’s view of the
386
APA and the First Amendment.

While the networks are correct in stating that the Second Circuit never
substantively addressed the FCC’s regulatory authority, a fair reading of the
entire opinion illustrates the court’s view that the FCC’s policy regarding
fleeting expletives would most likely not survive judicial scrutiny.
Had the Supreme Court not accepted review, the FCC would have likely
come up with a new explanation for their change in policy regarding fleeting
expletives. This situation would have resulted in significant confusion among
broadcasters. After all, broadcasters would have had to decide whether to
abide by the updated FCC policy or rely on a potential constitutional claim
outlined in the Second Circuit’s dictum. This confusion could have lasted for
several years due to the time it takes for a case to be reheard along with a
potential request to the Supreme Court on appeal. With the Supreme Court
granting certiorari, the Court must move beyond this administrative issue and
address the substantive challenges to the FCC indecency policy.
2. Does Fox v. FCC Conflict With Pacifica?
One of the most heavily briefed issues was whether the Second Circuit’s
decision conflicted with Pacifica. The FCC contends that the Second Circuit’s
decision conflicted with the “context-driven approach governing broadcast

385. Id. at 467.
386. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *15.
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indecency upheld in Pacifica.”387 Specifically, the FCC reasons that the
Second Circuit decision incorrectly rejects the FCC’s contextual approach to
determining whether a broadcast is indecent.388
In Pacifica, Justice Stevens wrote that “we must consider its [a
broadcast’s] context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action
was constitutionally permissible.”389 The FCC argues that the Pacifica
decision supports the notion that countervailing concerns regarding First
Amendment protection and artistic importance must be taken into
consideration when determining indecency.390 After all, in Pacifica, the Court
recognized simultaneously the ‘first blow’ theory and the importance of
context.391 Using this contextual approach, the FCC found that the use of the
F-word during a bona fide news program could be excused whereas the same
word used during an awards show could be considered indecent.392 Similarly,
the FCC found that the use of the F-word and S-word in the airing of the movie
Saving Private Ryan was not indecent because of their importance to the
artistic nature of the work.393The FCC argues that this approach, rather than a
per se prohibition or exemption of specific words altogether, represents a better
approach to public policy.394 This cleverly put together argument, however,
fails to properly frame the issue.
The FCC’s argument is both misdirected and fundamentally flawed. The
argument is misdirected because the FCC focuses too squarely on the Second
Circuit’s criticism of the ‘first blow’ theory. In Fox, the majority emphasized
how the rationale behind the ‘first blow’ theory did not comport with the
FCC’s actual policy. This disconnect occurred because viewers were forced to
suffer the ‘first blow’ of the F-word or S-word even in broadcasts that the FCC
determined to be appropriate due to their context. Viewers, especially
children, may not be able to differentiate the difference between the use of
expletives in a typical action movie compared to their use in Saving Private
Ryan. The FCC misconstrues this discussion to mean that the Second Circuit
advocated a per se exemption for fleeting expletives without any consideration
toward context. This is not correct. Rather, the Second Circuit was explaining
how the reasoning behind the FCC’s change in policy failed to satisfy the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.

387. Id.
388. See id. at **15–19.
389. Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *17 (quoting Justice Stevens in FCC v. Pacifica,
438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978)).
390. See Petition for Writ, 2007 WL 3231567 at *17.
391. Id. at *18.
392. Id. at *16.
393. Id.
394. See id. at **18–19.
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The FCC’s policy regarding fleeting expletives is also fundamentally
flawed. Ironically, the FCC’s policy, rather than the Second Circuit’s decision,
ignores the importance of context laid out in Pacifica and its progeny. By
instituting a policy where the F-word and S-word are presumptively indecent,
the FCC is effectively eliminating the necessary contextual component. The
FCC claims that it is “difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether a
word is being used as an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or
excretory functions.”395 The Second Circuit rightly found that this lacks
common sense. The F-word and S-word carry a variety of meanings when
used in different contexts. By making these words presumptively indecent, the
FCC is disregarding the base of their very own argument: that contextual
analysis is critical. For these reasons, I do not believe the Supreme Court will
find the Second Circuit’s decision directly contrary to the Pacifica decision.
3. Supreme Court Must Address the Substantive Issues to Assuage
Broadcaster Confusion
As both Fox and NBC emphasized in their petitions, the Supreme Court
has never directly ruled on the issue of the FCC’s authority to regulate fleeting
expletives under § 1464.396 Justice Stevens and Justice Powell both made it
clear in Pacifica that their holding did not speak to fleeting and isolated
expletives.397 For the thirty years after Pacifica, the FCC practiced a policy
where fleeting expletives were not generally actionable.398 With the FCC’s
abrupt change in policy, the Supreme Court will likely determine whether the
FCC has the authority under § 1464 to regulate fleeting expletives.
Because the Second Circuit never ruled on any of the substantive
challenges to the FCC indecency policy, the Supreme Court may approach this
issue from a variety of angles. This makes the case very hard to predict.
Issues such as the congruency between the FCC policy and Congressional
intent, the constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency test and the level of
scrutiny broadcast speech receives, for example, could come to the foreground
of the discussion regarding the FCC’s regulatory authority. For the Court to
adequately resolve the issue of the FCC’s authority, it must not sidestep the
network’s substantive challenges. After all, if the Supreme Court fails to
address these challenges, broadcasters will continue to question the FCC’s
authority, leading to an excess of Enforcement Bureau appeals and
unnecessary future litigation.

395. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Remand
Order, supra note 157, at 13308).
396. Brief in Opposition of Respondent, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2008 WL
320502 at *10.
397. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 747; see id. at 760–61.
398. See supra notes 271–81.
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CONCLUSION
When people think of U2’s lead singer Bono, most think of either his
musical career or his charitable efforts around the world. The FCC, on the
other hand, sees Bono in a different light. Because of his remark during the
2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono set off a firestorm which became part of the
catalyst for the FCC’s dramatic departure from past regulatory policy. Seeking
to punish broadcasters for any fleeting uses of the words “fuck” and “shit,” the
new FCC Policy did not sit well with the networks, resulting in the case being
heard before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather than addressing the
FCC’s constitutional boundaries for regulating broadcasts, the Fox Court ruled
against the FCC on administrative grounds. By rejecting the FCC’s policy as
“arbitrary and capricious,” the court found that the policy lacked the adequate
reasoning necessary for a shift in agency policy. The decision failed to create
clear guidance for broadcasters, resulting in a short-term solution to a longterm problem. With a temporarily invalidated Remand Order, a decision that
continued to keep networks guessing and the threat of speech being chilled, the
Supreme Court stepped in and granted certiorari. This very act of granting
certiorari most likely indicates some level of dissatisfaction with the Second
Circuit’s decision. With a bevy of potential issues, the Court will face the task
of outlining the boundaries of the FCC’s regulatory authority. If the Supreme
Court is serious about addressing the confusion regarding the FCC’s ability to
regulate fleeting expletives, they must address the issues that the Second
Circuit unfortunately shied away from in 2007.
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